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Administrative Remedies for Hazardous Waste
Victims: Prospects for U.S. Action in an
International Perspective
I. Introduction
The hazardous waste disposal problem is increasingly a concern
of industrialized nations. There are between 5000 and 50,000 inac-
tive or abandoned hazardous waste sites in the United States,' 1200
to 2000 of which are believed to pose "an immediate threat to the
health of millions of Americans." 2 Approximately eighty billion
pounds of hazardous wastes are generated each year-350 pounds
per U.S. citizen-an amount that has been increasing by approxi-
mately ten percent per year.3 Importantly, only ten percent of the
hazardous wastes generated in the United States have been disposed
of safely and properly. 4
Because the exact scope of the hazardous waste disposal prob-
lem is unknown, the environmental and health risks posed by dispo-
sal cannot be easily ascertained. Difficulties in linking specific
hazardous wastes to specific health effects 5 and the long latency pe-
riod of many diseases related to hazardous substances 6 further com-
plicate the picture. Nonetheless, a number of incidents have served
notice that improper hazardous waste disposal poses a serious and
long-term threat to human health and the environment.
Hooker Chemical dumped millions of tons of chemical wastes
into the Love Canal in New York, exposing local residents to a vari-
ety of harmful substances and resulting in legal claims exceeding two
I AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, TOXIC TORTS: PROPOSALS FOR COMPENSATING
VICTIMS OF HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES 3 (1984) [hereinafter AEI].
2 Shaw, Cihon, & Myers, The DiscoverT Rule: Fainless in Toxic Tort Statutes of Limitations,
33 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 491, 491 (1984-85).
3 S. EPSTEIN, L. BROWN & C. POPE, HAZARDOUS WASTE IN AMERICA 7 (1982)[herein-
after EPSTEIN]; see also Shaw, Cihon, & Myers, supra note 2, at 491.
4 EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 7; Shaw, Cihon, & Myers, supra note 2, at 491-92: "Until
recently, this waste was routinely disposed of in the cheapest way possible with little or no
regard for the environment." Disposal methods used in the past frequently amounted to
no more than dumping the waste into rivers, ponds, and streams, or burying them in
empty fields. "[A]s one state official observed of the historic disposal practices, '[a]ll it
took was a backhoe.' " Houck, This Side of Heresy: Conditioning Lonisiana "s Ten- Year Industrial
Tax Exenption Upon Cooipliance with Environiental Laws, 61 TUL. L. REV. 289, 327 (1986).
5 See infra notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
(I See ii'ra note 53 and accompanying text.
N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
billion dollars. 7 The toxic carcinogenic pesticide kepone was
dumped and carried into the James River, causing in excess of 500
million dollars in damages." Dumping of wastes in rural areas is "ex-
tensive and destructive,"9 and inadequate or improper storage of liq-
uid wastes poses a serious threat to groundwater.' 0 Exposure to
various hazardous substances has been linked to "cancer, genetic
mutation, birth defects, miscarriages, and damage to the lungs, liver,
kidneys, or nervous system.""
Thus, although the health and environmental damages caused
by hazardous wastes cannot be quantified with any degree of exacti-
tude, the problem is clearly a significant one, and the need to re-
spond, urgent. The U.S. political and judicial systems, however,
have shown an alarming lack of alacrity in responding to the hazard-
ous waste crisis, particularly in terms of providing persons injured by
hazardous substances with an adequate forum and remedy.
Congress has adopted two major legislative schemes to deal with
the hazardous waste problem. The Resource Conservation and Re-
covery Act of 1976 (RCRA)' 2 created a "cradle-to-grave" program
for "tracking of hazardous wastes through the production cycle from
creation to disposal."1 3 RCRA failed, however, to address the issue
of improper disposal of wastes that occurred prior to adoption of the
statute. Thus, in 1980 Congress enacted the Comprehensive Envi-
ronmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA),' 14
which established a "superfund" to be used to finance cleanup of
waste sites and "imposed cleanup liability on specified parties."' 5 As
part of a compromise to ensure passage of CERCLA, however, provi-
sions of the Senate bill authorizing a federal cause of action for per-
sons injured by hazardous substance disposal were deleted from the
Act. Instead, a "study group" was created to examine the issue of
victim compensation. 16
7 EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 8, 38, 92-101.
8 Id. at 8, 38.
) Id. at 67.
Io Developments in the Law-Toxic Wf aste Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1458, 1463
(1986) [hereinafter Developments].
I I Id. at 1462.
12 Pub. L. No. 94-580, § 1, 90 Stat. 2795, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (1982). For a
discussion of the background of RCRA and the political aspects of its enactment, see EP-
STEIN, supra note 3, at 189-94.
I' Developments, supra note 10, at 1471.
14 Pub. L. No. 96-510, § 1, 94 Stat. 2767, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1982). See
EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 197-221 for a discussion of the events leading up to the adoption
of the statute.
i5 Developments, supra note 10, at 1464; EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 272-73.
"; 42 U.S.C. § 9651 (e)(1982). Frost, Superfund Issues, in Toxic TORTS: LITIGATION OF
HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE CASES 297 (G.Z. Nothstein ed. 1984)[hereinafter Toxic TORTS].
The Report of the Study Group is found at SENATE COMM. ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC
WORKS, 97TH CONG., 2D SESS., INJURIES AND DAMAGES FROM HAZARDOUS WASTES-ANALY-
SIS AND IMPROVEMENT OF LEGAL REMEDIES: A REPORT TO CONGRESS IN COMPLIANCE WITH
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Although the Superfund Study Group recommended sweeping
changes in the tort system as applied to toxic injury cases and the
establishment of an administrative compensation system for victims
of toxic torts, 17 the proposals have not been enacted. Plaintiffs in
hazardous waste cases are thus left to struggle with the tort system,
with little success.
The tort system has been a wholly inadequate forum for resolv-
ing disputes arising in the hazardous waste arena. "J]ustice for vic-
tims has been inconsistent, inequitable, and slow. Insolvency has
jeopardized compensation in many cases. A torrent of litigation has
forced companies to file for bankruptcy .... ,,18 Plaintiffs and defend-
ants alike have found the tort system inefficient and unfair. The sys-
tem has failed to adjust to a problem "unprecedented in its scientific
and medical complexity and in its potential for major health and eco-
nomic impact." 19
Although the United States has been unwilling to adapt its legal
system to meet the challenge of this crisis, other countries have taken
substantive steps towards establishing more just and effective com-
pensation schemes. Japan, responding to an outbreak of environ-
mental disasters, enacted an administrative plan for compensating
pollution victims. 20 New Zealand has embraced a no-fault adminis-
trative scheme that completely replaces the common law in cases of
personal injury resulting from accidents.21
This Comment will analyze the shortcomings of U.S. tort law in
the hazardous waste injury area in light of the goals of the tort sys-
tem. The administrative approaches of Japan and New Zealand will
be examined, and the possible application of these approaches in the
United States will be discussed. Finally, recommendations will be
§ 301 (E) OF THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION AND LIABILITY
ACT OF 1980 (Comm. Print 1982).
17 See Compensation for Exposure to Hazardous Substances: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Investigation and Oversight, House Comm. on Science and Technology, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 151-52
(1982)(statement of Frank Grad, Reporter for Superfund Study Group)[hereinafter 1982
Hearings]. The compensation scheme recommended by the Study Group provided for no-
fault compensation of toxic injuries using relaxed standards of causation. Victims would,
under the second "tier" of the system, also be able to pursue suits at common law. The
Study Group recommended that statutes of limitations and liability rules be "modernized"
in order to make recovery at common law less difficult. Frost, supra note 16, at 297-98.
18 Marcus, Compensating Victims for Harms Caused by Pollution and Other Hazardous Sub-
stances: A Comparison of American and Japanese Policies, 8 LAw & POL'v 189, 205 (1986).
19 1982 Hearings, supra note 17, at 142.
2o Law for the Compensation of Pollution-Related Health Injury (Kagai Kenk6 Higai
Hosh6 H6)(1973, Law No. I l)[hereinafterJapanese Compensation Law]. See infra notes
128-133 and accompanying text for a discussion of the law.
21 Accident Compensation Act of 1972 [1972], 1 N.Z. Stat. 521; legislation and subse-
quent amendments consolidated and reprinted as Accident Compensation Act 1982
[1982], 3 N.Z. Stat. 1552 [hereinafter ACA]. See infra notes 142-145 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the ACA.
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made concerning the future course of action to be taken in the
United States.
II. Tort Litigation in the United States
The tort law system utilized in the United States arguably at-
tempts to reach four major goals. The first goal is to compensate the
victims of wrongs committed by identifiable, culpable parties. 22 The
second goal is to achieve "justice" and operate "fairly" as between
the parties involved.23 The tort system's third major goal is to at-
tempt to reduce the incidence of wrongful conduct (i.e. to deter
wrongdoers).2 4 Finally, tort law seeks to accomplish the preceding
goals so as to further the broader interests of society. Serious ques-
tions exist, however, about whether the tort system is capable of
achieving its objectives within the toxic injury context.
A. Compensation Goal
For a number of reasons, tort law has been unable to fully or
adequately compensate the victims of hazardous substance-related
injuries. The primary difficulties facing victims are barriers to enter-
ing the legal system and shortcomings in state common law, espe-
cially in terms of proving causation.
1. Entry Problems
a. Litigation Costs/Access to the Judicial System
The costs associated with pursuing a toxic tort case are extraor-
dinarily high. Due to the complexity of the scientific and medical
issues being litigated and the need for expensive expert testimony to
establish causation, 25 the cost of litigation is often "a very substantial
barrier" to plaintiffs.2 6 Many plaintiffs simply cannot afford to pur-
sue their cases because of the high costs of bringing a toxic tort suit,
which often exceed $100,000 not including attorney fees. 27 The
22 Roisman, Common Law Toxic Tort Litigation: Strengths, Weaknesses, Reforms, Alternatives,
in Toxic TORT LITIGATION 77-78 (1984).
23 See Garrett, Compensating Victimis of Toxic Substances: Issues Concerning Proposed Federal
Legislation, 13 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,172, 10,175-76 (1983).
24 Roisman, supra note 22, at 78.
[T]ort law must both calculate accident costs and internalize those costs
to individuals and entities that can control the magnitude of accident costs
either by avoiding accidents altogether or by reducing their conse-
quences.... Theoretically, tort law forces internalization of all accident costs
considered in the damage calculation process to individuals or entities who,
by virtue of a judicial finding of "fault," are believed to be in a position to
control accident costs.
Pierce, Encouraging Safety: The Lim its of Tort Law and Government Regulation, 33 VAND. L. REv.
1281, 1295 (1980).
25 See infra notes 51-58 and accompanying text.
26 1982 learings, supra note 17, at 144-45.
27 Roisman, supra note 22, at 81; see also Note, Compensating l'ictims of Hazardous Sub-
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availability of contingent fee arrangements is not likely to remove the
cost barrier. Even where the attorney accepts a contingent fee and
advances litigation costs to the plaintiff, the plaintiff must eventually
repay the costs so advanced. Given that chances for success on the
merits are small in most toxic torts cases, 28 plaintiffs and attorneys
alike will no doubt find such an arrangement unsatisfactory.
b. Premature/Unfair Settlements
One consequence of the enormous expense associated with haz-
ardous waste litigation is the likelihood that plaintiffs will accept pre-
mature and insufficient settlements, 29 again eliminating the prospect
of full compensation. The immediate and overwhelming financial
burdens facing potential plaintiffs-court costs, attorney fees, and
medical expenses, among others-skew the "calculus of settlement"
in toxic torts cases,30 encouraging victims to settle early for less than
full compensation. Defendants, able to hire more "impressive"
counsel and more familiar with the legal process, are often able to
garner highly favorable settlements from victims unfamiliar with and
terrified by the prospect of testifying at trial.3 1 Defendants also have
greater access to information concerning the hazardous processes
and substances involved. As a result, plaintiffs unaware of "potential
chronic effects ...may negotiate a settlement based [only] on the
harm that has manifested itself to date."'3 2
c. Unavailability of Class Actions
Plaintiffs might be able to avoid the problems of high cost and
unequal bargaining power by initiating class action lawsuits. Unfor-
tunately, class actions are almost always unavailable to toxic tort
victims.
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which governs
certification of class actions, has been adopted in substance by most
states.3 3 Rule 23(a) requires, as prerequisites to a class action, that
1) the class be so large that 'joinder of all members is impractica-
ble," 2) there are "questions of law or fact common to the class,"
3) the claims of the representative parties are typical of those of the
class, and 4) the representative parties will adequately protect the
stance Pollution in the United States and Japan: A Comparative Analysis, 7 FORDIJAM INT'L L.J.
501, 505-06 (1984).
28 See infra notes 51-68 and accompanying text.
21) Trauberman, Statutor
, 
Reform of "Toxic Torts ": Relieving Legal, Scientific, and Economic
Burdens on the Chemical Victim, 7 HARV. ENV'L. L. REV. 177, 189 (1983).
30 Soble, A Proposal for the Administrative Compensation of Victims of Toxic Substance Pollu-
tion: A Model Act, 14 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 683, 712-13 (1977).
31 Luntz, Proposals for a National Compensation Scheme, 55 LAW INST. J. 745, 747 (198 1).
32 Trauberman, supra note 29, at 190-91.
33 Goldsmith, Pleadings and Discovery, in Toxic TORTS, supra note 16, at 424 & n.45.
Thirty-three states have adopted the substance of the federal rule. Id.
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class' interests.3 4 Additionally, Rule 23(b) requires that one of the
following conditions be met: 1) prosecution of individual actions by
class members would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudi-
cations, or would be dispositive of or impair the rights or interests of
class members not parties to the suit; or 2) the defendant has acted
in a manner so as to justify final injunctive relief with respect to the
class; or 3) common questions of law or fact "predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members," and the class action is
superior to other means of adjudicating the controversy.3 5 More-
over, best practicable notice of the class action must be made to ab-
sent members of the class. 3 6
Victims of toxic torts typically face several obstacles to class ac-
tion certification. Generally, subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2) of Rule 23
are of limited use in toxic tort suits, leaving plaintiffs to attempt to
gain certification under subsection (b)(3).3 7 Frequently, however,
plaintiffs cannot meet the predominance and superiority require-
ments of (b)(3). Because victims may have been exposed to different
wastes produced or disposed of by different companies over a long
period of time, plaintiffs may rely on different theories of causation
and fault, and there may be multiple defendants, "each defendant
raising defenses possibly peculiar to it."'3 8 Thus, courts have tended
to disfavor 23(b)(3) certification of hazardous waste actions.3 9
d. Lack of Federal Cause of Action
As noted above, 40 a major obstacle to adequate compensation of
victims of hazardous waste exposure is the lack of a federal statutory
cause of action. Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that the ma-
jor regulatory schemes in various environmental pollution areas have
34 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a). See Goldsmith, supra note 33, at 424-26.
35 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b).
36 Id. 23(c)(2). Toxic tort victims are often unable to meet this notice requirement.
Soble, supra note 30, at 704.
37 Goldsmith, supra note 33, at 426-27.
38 Id. at 428.
39 See, e.g., Abed v. A.H. Robins Co., 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1.982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1171 (1983)(reversing certification under 23(b)(3) of Dalkon Shield class action, on
grounds that consolidated discovery and use of test cases superior to class action); Snyder
v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 104 Misc. 2d 735, 429 N.Y.S.2d 153 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1980)(denying class action certification of group of Love Canal victims, on grounds that
reliance on different theories of liability rendered class suit unavailable); Ryan v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 84 F.R.D. 230 (D.S.C. 1979)(denying certification of class action in DES suit, on
grounds that length of exposure, reason for using drug, and state of art at time of con-
sumption were different for different class members, thus removing predominance of
questions of law and fact); see also Advisory Committee's Note to Proposed Amendments to
Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts, 39 F.R.D. 69, 103
(1966)(stating that "mass accidents" are generally not certifiable tinder Rule 23(b)(3) due
to "likelihood that significant questions, not only of damages but of liability and defenses
to liability, would be present, affecting individuals in different ways.").
40 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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"occupied the field," preempting traditional "federal common law"
remedies for pollution-related injuries.4 ' Thus, plaintiffs must look
to state common law theories for relief.
2. Problems with State Common Law
State law provides numerous potential causes of action for vic-
tims of toxic torts: negligence, nuisance, trespass, strict liability at
common law, 42 and statutory remedies for compensating victims in a
few states. 43 Although each of these causes of action has unique
benefits and shortcomings, there are pervasive inadequacies in the
tort system as a whole that "cut across doctrinal lines" and generally
render the remedies ineffective. 4 4
a. Statutes of Limitations
Statutes of limitations are the "most serious obstacle faced by
toxic tort victims." '4 5 Under traditional statutes, which start the judi-
cial clock running at the time of the wrong or injury, toxic tort vic-
tims are often barred from bringing suit. "Because many diseases
caused by toxic substances are characterized by lengthy latency peri-
ods in which the victim is unaware of any injury, those at risk from
hazardous chemicals may not seek timely legal redress." 4 6 Under
the traditional rule, plaintiffs frequently find that the limitations pe-
riod has run before they even discover that they have been injured. 4 7
In an attempt to ameliorate the harshness of the traditional rule,
many states have adopted so-called "discovery rules" to be applied
to limitations periods for injuries from hazardous waste exposure. 48
Under these rules, the statute of limitations generally does not begin
41 Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981)(Federal Water Pollution Control Act
preempts common law nuisance remedies for effluent emission damages); Middlesex Cty.
Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U.S. I (1981)(Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act and Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act preempt common
law nuisance claims; no implied private cause of action arises from either Act). The pre-
emption rule was applied to hazardous waste cases specifically in Philadelphia v. Stephan
Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 425 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
42 See Pollan, Theories of Liability, in Toxic TORTS, snpra note 16, at 301-27; Johns &
Seltzer, Toxic Torts: Theories of Liability, in PREPARATION AND TRIAL OF A COMPLEX Toxic
CHEMICAL OR HAZARDOUS WASTE CASE 328-44 (1986).
43 See Johns & Seltzer, supra note 42, at 323-28. Alaska, California, Minnesota, Ore-
gon, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina have all adopted such statutory programs. These
plans, however, are "few in number and limited in scope." Id. at 328.
44 Trauberman, supra note 29, at 188-89.
45 Shaw, Cihon, & Myers, supra note 2, at 494.
46 EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 279.
47 Snpefind Reauthorization: Judicial and Legal Issues: Oversight Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on theJudieiary, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 417 (1985)(statement ofJanet Hathaway, Staff Atty., Public Citizen's Con-
gress Watch Concerning H.R. 2817)[hereinafter 1985 Hearings].
48 Thirty-nine states have adopted some form of "discovery rule." See Shaw, Cihon,
& Myers, supra note 2, at 494-95 n.20.
19871 283
N.CJ. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
to run until the plaintiff has "discovered" that he or she has been
injured. These "discovery rules," however, have significantly diver-
gent provisions regarding what constitutes "discovery" and when the
statute of limitations begins to run. Some states begin to run the
statute when the plaintiff actually discovers his or her injury, others
when plaintiff should know of the injury or when the injury is "capable
of ascertainment"; thirteen jurisidictions start the period of limita-
tions running when plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the
injury and its cause; only thirteen states adopt the most protective
"discovery rule," that the limitations period begins to run when
plaintiff discovers or should discover that he or she has an injury and
has a cause of action.49
Even the emergence of the "discovery rule," therefore, may not
be sufficient to save a plaintiff's cause of action. Plaintiffs will still be
at the mercy of the formulation of the "discovery rule" adopted by
the jurisdiction where they reside or where their injuries occurred, a
fortuitous circumstance at best. Moreover, most of the so-called
"liberal" limitations rules still bar plaintiffs who discover the fact of
injury but are unable to pinpoint a specific cause for many years.
"[E]ven if a plaintiff discovers her injury before it is time-barred, she
may fail either to recognize the causal connection between her injury
and past exposure to toxic waste or to identify a liable defendant
before the time limitation has run. ' 50
b. Proof/Causation Problems
Assuming that the toxic victim is able to identify the existence of
an injury and its likely cause and bring suit before the operation of a
time-bar, problems of proving the nature and cause of the injury and
the culpability of the defendant will arise. Recovery in hazardous
waste litigation depends on proving three things:
First, it is necessary to identify the particular hazardous waste that
caused or threatened to cause the injury. Second, the responsible
party ... whose actions are an actual cause of the exposure to the
harmful waste, must be identified. Third, the defendant's actions
must be sufficiently connected with the injuries, so that the courts, as
a policy matter, will hold the defendant liable.5 1
Proving each of these factors involves a number of difficulties.
i. Proving Injury from Hazardous Waste
Establishing that plaintiff's injury was caused by a particular haz-
ardous substance involves extremely complex scientific and medical
41) See 1985 Heauings, supra note 47, at 426-28 for a list of which states have adopted
which "discovery rule"; see also Developments, supra note 10, at 1607.
50 Developments, snpra note 10, at 1605; see also Johns & Seltzer, supra note 43, at 331-
32.
51 EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 275.
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issues. In many cases, it is impossible to prove, to the degree re-
quired by most courts, the cause of plaintiff's injuries. First, the ori-
gin of many chronic illnesses, and the link between hazardous wastes
and these illnesses, is difficult to prove. 52 The long latency periods
of many toxic diseases further complicates the picture. As the time
between exposure to the hazardous waste and manifestation of a re-
lated injury lengthens, causation becomes increasingly attenuated
and uncertain.
Causation issues such as whether the claimant was in fact ex-
posed to the toxic substance years before, what the circumstances of
that exposure were, whether there were other exposures to the sub-
stance for which different persons bear responsibility, or whether
there were exposures to other substances which contribute to the
injury ... arise, making proof of causation more burdensome. 53
As a result of these problems of proof, direct evidence of causa-
tion is often unavailable in toxic tort cases. 54 Plaintiffs must instead
rely on statistical evidence that establishes causation in correlative or
probabilistic terms. 5 5 One means of establishing this form of statisti-
cal proof is through the use of epidemiology, which is "the study of
patterns of disease occurrence in populations and factors which in-
fluence those patterns." 56 Although the inapplicability of direct evi-
dence in the toxic tort arena and the generally acknowledged
accuracy of epidemiological studies has led some commentators to
recommend that courts accept such indirect evidence, 57 most courts
have been unwilling to lower their standards of proof and allow sta-
tistical evidence to suffice as proof of causation. 58
Several developments, however, offer hope for toxic tort plain-
52 Note, supra note 27, at 505. See Trauberman, supra note 29,
In cases involving chronic health effects ... any of numerous factors may
be the cause of the condition. Furthermore, because the relative contribu-
tion of genetic makeup and external environment to human health is difficult
to determine, discerning the extent to which environmental contaminants
contribute to any particular illness may be likewise difficult.
Id. at 181.
5"1 Schwartz & Means, The Need for Federal Product Liability and Toxic Tort Legislation: .4
Current Assessmient, 28 VILL. L. REV. 1088, 1100 (1982-83); see also 1982 Hearings, supra note
17, at 139.
54 McElveen & Eddy, Cancer and Toxic Substances: The Problem of Causation and the.Use of
Epidemiology, 33 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 29, 47 (1984-85).
55 Trauberman, supra note 29, at 198.
56 McElveen & Eddy, supra note 54, at 38.
57 See, e.g., id. at 31; see also Comment, Epideliologic Proof of Probability: Implenlenting the
Poportional Recovery Approach in Toxic Exposure Torts, 89 DICK. L. REv. 233 (1984).
511 Trauberman, supra note 29, at 198; McElveen & Eddy, supra note 54, at 31.
While [epidemiologic] ... evidence may also suggest causation in the indi-
vidual case, statistical probability does not rise to the traditional "more-
likely-than-not" standard of proof. Therefore, while it may be likely that a
defendant in a toxic tort case caused an increased occurrence of injuries
among a group of persons, the individual plaintiff may be unable to establish
the element of causation necessary to recover.
Comment, supra note 57, at 234-35.
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tiffs. First, several courts have demonstrated a willingness to accept
and weigh statistical evidence on the issue of causation. 59 Second,
evidence from immune-system testing has recently been used suc-
cessfully to establish causation in several toxic tort cases. 60 It must
be remembered, however, that the cost of obtaining epidemiological
or immune-system evidence may still be prohibitive for most toxic
tort victims, 6' and whether widespread acceptance of relaxed stan-
dards of causation will occur remains to be seen.
ii. Identifying Responsible Defendants
Plaintiffs also face numerous hurdles in identifying the party or
parties responsible for their injuries. "Lawsuits must name people,
businesses, or other organizations as defendants. Even if victims can
identify the chemical agent that caused their diseases, they still must
show who was responsible for their exposure to that substance. ' '62
This may be impossible:
A given dump site might contain several dozen kinds of hazardous
waste, discarded over many years, from a hundred different genera-
tors. The site might have been under the control and management'
of several different owners or operators, who used levels of care
ranging from recklessness to application of the best technology
available. Moreover, many of the business entities responsible
might have changed ownership or gone out of business. Finally, if
one does determine that certain parties ought to be responsible,
they may have insufficient assets to meet their obligations. 63
The problems are exacerbated in cases involving diseases with long
latency periods. 64
iii. Proving Proximate Cause/Fault
Should plaintiff succeed in proving the causal connection be-
tween a particular defendant's hazardous agent and his or her injury,
plaintiff must still establish that defendant caused the injury-that is,
that defendant is culpable in some way.
Here again, traditional requirements can defeat recovery. A de-
59 See, e.g., Kehm v. Proctor & Gamble, 724 F.2d 613 (8th Cir. 1983)(epidemiological
evidence held admissible in toxic shock syndrome case); In re [Swine Flu Immunization]
Products Liability Litigation, Alvarez v. United States, 495 F. Supp. 1188, 1203 (D.C.
Colo. 1980)("we must consider epidemiologic studies to determine if the disease is caus-
ally related to an antecedent event").
60 See Roisman, Proving Cause in Toxic-Tort Litigation: The Threshold of a New Era, 22
TRIAL 59, 59-60 (10) (Oct. 1986).
45 Id. at 60; see supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
"5 Trauberman, supra note 29, at 200.
(63 Developments, supra note 10, at 1463-64; see also Note, The Inapplicability of Traditional
Tort Analysis to Environmental Risks: The Example of Toxic Waste Pollution Victim Compensation, 35
STAN. L. REV. 575, 584 (1983): "The victim may be unable to locate a defendant worth
suing. Potential defendants such as waste generators, haulers, and disposers may be insol-
vent or defunct by the time the tort action is brought."
4;' See 1982 Hearings, supra note 17, at 144-46.
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fendant is held liable only if it is proven to be more likely than not
that the defendant's action caused the plaintiff's injury. But a toxic
tort plaintiff typically can show only a 'causal linkage' between the
toxic substance to which he was exposed and his type of disease or
affliction.
6 5
Moreover, common law liability usually rests on a showing that
defendant acted unreasonably in causing plaintiff's injury. This re-
quirement is also very hard for plaintiffs to meet, 6 6 because victims
will rarely have access to evidence concerning defendants' actions,
which may have occurred ten to twenty years earlier.6 7 Defendants
may also be able to successfully escape liability by proving that their
past actions conformed to the "state of the art" of waste handling
and disposal at that time and were therefore not unreasonable. 68
c. Recovering Damages
Even ultimate success on the merits does not guarantee that a
plaintiff will be fully compensated under tort law.
Even after a victim has identified a substance and a potentially liable
party, sometimes it is impossible to recover from that party. A com-
pany that once contaminated the environment may no longer exist;
it may have declared bankruptcy or otherwise ceased to do business;
or it may lack the financial resources to compensate victims fully.
6 9
The success of a large number of plaintiffs may itself force the de-
fendant into bankruptcy, "precluding full recovery on existing claims
and any recovery on future ones. ' 7
0
Overall, then, it appears that the tort system does not meet the
goal of adequate compensation of victims of hazardous waste, nor
will proposed modifications in the tort system remedy the shortcom-
ings of that system.
B. Fairness Goal
1. Fairness to Plaintiffs
For the reasons discussed above, it can be argued that the tort
system is "unfair" to plaintiffs who have been injured by wrongful
conduct but cannot recover because of high standards of proof and
causation and shortcomings in medical and scientific technology.
Moreover, the lack of uniform handling of toxic waste cases by state
courts is a further source of unfairness to plaintiffs. "One of the
greatest inequities facing . . . victims is the great variability of state
65 Note, supra note 63, at 583. See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
66 Trauberman, supra note 29, at 192-94.
67 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
" See Ballanfant, Defenses, in Toxic TORTS, supra note 16, at 392-93 for a discussion
of the "state of the art" defense. This defense may not be available when plaintiff pro-
ceeds under a strict liability theory. Id. at 393-97.
69 Trauberman, supra note 29, at 200.
7o Note, supra note 63, at 585. See infra notes 98-103 and accompanying text.
1987]
N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
law and procedure determining their chances of success .... Vic-
tims who happen to reside or be injured in Texas or New Jersey
stand far greater chances of recovering ... than someone with a sub-
stantially identical suit from South Dakota or Ohio." '7 1 Further,
damage awards tend to be "arbitrary and unfair to plaintiffs and de-
fendants alike." 72
2. Fairness to Defendants
The tort system also works inequities against defendants in toxic
exposure cases. Operation of "discovery rules,"' 73 for example, may
result in liability for use or disposal of a substance that was not
known to be dangerous at the time.74 Where defendants have acted
reasonably, based on information and technology available to them
at the time of their action, imposition of liability may pose problems
relating to equity:
Imposing liability on waste generators and disposers for past actions
may be neither fair nor efficient, if doing so requires judges to hold
defendants to today's knowledge and standards rather than to the
technological competence prevalent at the time of disposal. Where
waste generators and disposers sincerely knew little about the dan-
gerous nature of the waste they disposed or of the manner of dispo-
sal, it is hard to find them liable ex post.
7 5
Such a retroactive approach to liability "raises serious constitutional
due process questions" and implicates "concepts of fairness and sub-
stantial justice." 76
Importantly, many of the reforms proposed to ameliorate the
problems associated with toxic tort litigation would, while making
compensation of plaintiffs more likely, operate unfairly vis-a-vis de-
fendants. Lowering standards of causation, shifting burdens of
proof, and raising presumptions in favor of plaintiffs all suffer this
disadvantage. "Little fairness results from shifting the losses from
71 1985 Hearings, supra note 47, at 416. See supra note 49 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the lack of uniformity in the area of state statutes of limitations.
72 Trauberman. supra note 29, at 201. See Luntz, supra note 31, at 745, for a discus-
sion of the disparity of personal injury damage awards in Australia.
73 See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
74 Lisnek, Recent Decisions: Torts/Discovey Rules, 70 ILL. B.J. 658, 660 (1982).
75 Note, supra note 63, at 583.
M, Hazardous Substance Victim's Compensation Legislation: Hearings Before the Subconm. on
Commerce, Transportation, and Toursm, House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. 152-54 (1983) (statement of George Freeman, attorney)[hereinafter 1983 Hearings].
[R]etroactive laws are generally objectionable: We feel that a person is
morally entitled to know in advance what legal character and consequences
his acts have. A lawyer would emphasize that fairness, as for example par-
tially embodied in notions like due process of law, typically requires that a
person be apprised of the way in which the law will respond to his behavior.
A philosopher might suggest that 'ought' implies 'can'; it is morally unfair to
tell a person that he ought to do something if he cannot (because, as it devel-
ops, he has already done it).
Munzer, Retroactive Law, 6J. LEGAL STUD. 373, 391 (1977).
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innocent plaintiffs to innocent defendants. Proof of causation is a
well established element of tort law because it reflects the fundamen-
tal notion that it is not fair to hold a party responsible for harm he
has not caused."' 77 Given the uncertainties concerning the causes of
toxic-related injuries78 and the identity of responsible parties, 79 re-
vising the tort system so that it better achieves the compensation
goal may detract strongly from the fairness objective.
C. Deterrence Goal
Tort law attempts to reduce the incidence of harmful conduct by
allocating the costs of such conduct to the party deemed to be at
fault in causing the harm.80 The tort system attempts to force these
parties to internalize the costs of harmful conduct so as to encourage
"choice of the lesser of safety precaution costs and future liability
costs." 8' Theoretically, the potential of extensive tort liability will
induce major hazardous waste producers to reduce improper dispo-
sal and improve safety so as to avoid liability costs. For a number of
reasons, however, the tort system is an imperfect mechanism of cost
internalization and therefore fails to meet its deterrent objectives in
the hazardous substance field.
.First, many costs are not internalized because many victims of
hazardous waste either do not bring suit at all or go uncompensated
or undercompensated.8 2 Other costs are not internalized because
"many victims . . . settle for compensation well below the actual costs
of an accident."83 The problems of proving fault and establishing
causation also distort the internalization process.
Indeed, causation problems have led to an almost complete break-
down in the tort system as a mechanism for internalizing accident
costs .... [T]he judicial system typically externalizes accident costs
by refusing recovery to the victim who, in turn, externalizes the bulk
of the costs through first party insurance or social welfare
programs. 8 4
Second, many costs of hazardous waste injuries are re-external-
ized through pricing and insurance mechanisms. Companies can al-
ways pass on liability costs to consumers by simply raising prices.
Typically, though, liability costs are re-externalized through liability
insurance. Deterrence could still be effected, despite the existence
of liablity insurance, if insurance premiums adequately reflected the
77 Garrett, supra note 23, at 10,175.
78 See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
79 See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
" See supra note 24.
81 Abraham, Cost Intenialization, Insurance, and Toxic Tort Coinpensalion Funds, 2 VA. J.
NAT. RESOURCE L. 123, 126 (1982).
82 Trauberman, supra note 29, at 211.
8-3 Pierce, supra note 24, at 1296. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
84 Id. at 1298.
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risks of tort liability. "The problem in practice is that insurance costs
reflect only crudely, if at all, variations in risks of accidents among
firms and accidents." '8 5
The cost of premiums tends to be too high or too low. Accurate
prediction of claims is made difficult by the nature of toxic torts:
[T]he amount of damage that current and past uses of toxic sub-
stances ultimately will cause cannot be predicted. Scientific uncer-
tainty is one such reason; knowledge of the carcinogenic properties
of toxic chemicals is in its infancy. The synergistic effects of chemi-
cals that have been mixed together during storage in waste dumps
are even less clear. In addition, since the latency period between
exposure to chemicals and manifestation of disease is frequently
long-twenty years is not unusual-it is very difficult to predict how
risk a particular activity that uses toxic substances will turn out to
be.8
6
The complexity of liability rules, the uncertainty of litigation results,
and the "paucity of claims and the slow pace of tort litigation" fur-
ther retard the ability of insurance companies to properly peg premi-
ums.87 "As a result, the incentive for safety theoretically created by
the tort system is all but eliminated." '88
Recently, the tendency of insurance companies has been to re-
spond to the "sharp increase in environmental liability litigation" by
withdrawing from the environmental liability market altogether, or
writing policies that are "prohibitively costly."' 89 Many firms have
responded to this situation by emphasizing short-term consequences
over long-term consequences, discounting "at an irrational level
many safety risks whose consequences are not likely to be mani-
fested" until many years in the future.90 These firms have chosen to
"go bare," operating without liability insurance and risking bank-
ruptcy in the event of significant hazardous waste liability.9 1 Thus,
rather than responding to increased accident costs by attempting to
reduce those costs, as tort theory anticipates, these firms have cho-
sen to avoid all current costs of accidents and to expose themselves
to potentially staggering future CoStS. 9 2
Third, tort liability deterrence fails to impact many problems
that result in improper, illegal, and injurious use and disposal of haz-
ardous wastes. The prospect of liability cannot, for instance, over-
85 Id.
" Abraham, supra note 81, at 127.
87 Pierce, supra note 24, at 1299-1300.
8 Id. at 1299.
1" Developments, supra note 10, at 1575-76.
11o Pierce, supra note 24, at 1301.
91 Developments, supra note 10, at 1585; see also Abraham, supra note 81, at 128. The
"going bare" phenomenon is "widespread among, and limited to, small and medium-sized
firms." Pierce, supra note 24, at 1302-03. Given the fact that many of these firms fail each
year anyway, it may be "perfectly rational" for such firms to ignore potential liability that
will not arise for many years. Id.
92 Pierce, supra note 24, at 1301.
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come problems of inadequate disposal technology. The lack of
adequate disposal facilities, which often encourages illegal or "mid-
night" dumping of wastes, 93 also cannot be cured by imposing liabil-
ity on waste producers. Nor can tort liability deter unscrupulous
"midnight" dumpers, "lured by the promise of quick profits," 9 4
from disposing wastes in the cheapest way possible. In fact, there is
some evidence to indicate that attempts to impose greater liability on
dumpers will encourage more illegal dumping in an attempt to cir-
cumvent the high costs of liability.9 5
D. Societal Interests
The toxic tort liability system should further the broader goals
established by society. In at least two major areas, however, the tort
system as presently composed serves to impede these greater socie-
tal interests.
First, as more people are exposed to hazardous wastes, injured,
and seek redress, the court system may become too overloaded to
function efficiently, or to function at all. 96 The problem of court
clog will only worsen should courts relax standards of causation and
embrace novel theories of liability. The resulting crush on the judi-
cial system could prove disastrous: "[i]f we do not halt the current
trend toward more and more litigation, and do not find better means
for resolving these problems, the whole process will choke on itself,
leaving our environment despoiled, those injured uncompensated,
our courts hopelessly overburdened and our economy gravely
threatened.'"97
Second, an increase in successful litigation of toxic injury claims
could seriously disadvantage the economy. Once causation relating
to a particular disease or hazardous substance becomes established,
defendants will face "extremely high damage awards." 98 Actual or
potential damage awards may force some companies to opt for bank-
ruptcy. 99 Large firms that keep detailed records may be desirable
targets of plaintiffs seeking to reach deep pockets. Thus, especially
should "market share" liability' 0 0 theories continue to gain adher-
93 EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 172-73.
94 Id. at 153, 166.
95 Kehne, Encouraging Safety Through Insurance-Based Incentives: Financial Responsibility
for Hazardous Wastes, 96 YALE L.J. 403, 421-22 (1986). This has probably occurred due to
increased government regulation of waste disposal as well. EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 177.
90 Schwartz & Means, supra note 53, at 1098.
97 1983 Hearings, supra note 76, at 148.
1)8 Trauberman, supra note 29, at 191 n.63.
,! Kircher, Federal Product Legislation and Toxic Torts: The Defense Perspective, 28 VILL. L.
REV. 1116, 1132 (1982-83).
100 In Sindell v. Abbott Labs, 26 Cal.3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980), the California Supreme Court allowed recovery against a DES
manufacturer based on that manufacturer's percentage share of the DES market.
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ents, these firms could be subject to "double exposure" to suits and
damages.' 0 ' Given the potentially devastating effect of hazardous
wastes on human health and the environment, 02 the concomitant
impact of widespread liability on the U.S. economy could be equally
disastrous.103
In sum, the tort system falls short of achieving any of its identi-
fied goals. Importantly, many of the goals appear to be mutually ex-
clusive. Lowering barriers to achieve victim compensation will
produce results unfair to defendants, threaten the economy, and
clog the courts. Failing to lower these barriers means continued in-
adequacy of compensation of victims. In light of these problems, ex-
amination of the solutions found in other countries is not only
justified, but necessary.
III. Compensation Schemes in Japan and New Zealand
A. Japanese Compensation Law
In 1973, Japan enacted a comprehensive law designed to com-
pensate the victims of pollution-related injuries. 10 4 The law had its
genesis in three significant factors: 1) a deepening environmental
crisis in Japan; 2) judicial activism in fashioning redress for victims;
and 3) the general societal abhorrence of litigation in Japan.
Beginning in the mid-1950s, a series of strange new diseases be-
gan to appear in Japan: Minimata disease (mercury poisoning), Itai-
Itai disease (cadmium poisoning), and various pulminary disorders.
The source of the diseases was finally isolated, and pollution from
Japanese factories identified as the cause. 10 5 For many years, how-
ever, victims of the diseases were ostracized and ignored, as the com-
panies responsible for the injuries acted with "callous indifference"
and "cultivated arrogance" towards the injured.' 0 6 Eventually,
though, literature depicting the plight of the victims developed, and
the conduct of the polluters began to breed resentment and opposi-
tion in the public at large.' 0 7 First local and then national protests
occurred,' 08 and as mediation efforts failed, "litigation became a
101 Kircher, supra note 99, at 1133.
102 See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text.
103 In one asbestos case, a three million dollarjury award was made against a relatively
small company. Manville, facing two billion dollars in asbestos-injury claims, opted for
bankruptcy. Trauberman, supra note 29, at 191 n.63.
104 Japanese Compensation Law, supra note 20.
105 Marcus, supra note 18, at 195.
10 j. GRESSER, K. FUJIKURA, & A. MORISHIMA, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN JAPAN 31-33
(1981 )[hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL LAW].
107 Marcus, supra note 18, at 195; ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 106, at 31-33.
108 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 106, at 33-34.
The victims expressed their grievances and grief in highly ritualistic and
symbolic ways.... Disappointed that the trial proceedings had not permitted
them to confront Chisso [Manufacturing Company]'s executives, a group of
Minimata victims decided to buy shares of the company's stock in order to
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group effort of the victims' movement."' 10 9
This litigation effort, begun in 1968, culminated in a series of
four decisions-the "Big Four Pollution Cases."" 0 The first case in-
volved victims of Itai-Itai ("it hurts! it hurts!") disease.'I ' Because
the defendant was strictly liable under the Mining Law for the release
of cadmium, lead, and zinc compounds that contaminated local soil,
fish, and water supplies, the issue addressed by the court was
whether causation existed." l2 The Toyama District Court, aware of
the "practical difficulties the plaintiffs would face if the more strin-
gent standard of causation were employed,"" 3 accepted as sufficient
proof of causality the epidemiological, clinical, and animal tests in-
troduced by the plaintiffs.' ' 4 On appeal, the High Court affirmed
that "epidemiological evidence could be used in establishing legal
proof," and required that plaintiffs demonstrate that "(1) pollution
occurred before the outbreak of a disease; (2) increased exposure
could lead to an increase in the disease; (3) clinical and experimental
evidence did not contradict statistical inference of causality; and (4)
in areas of low pollution, incidences of the disease were dimin-
ished." 15 Based on plaintiffs' evidence, the Court awarded ten mil-
lion yen for "mental suffering" to the survivors of each deceased
victim and eight million yen to each living patient." 16
The next two cases involved Minimata disease or mercury
poisoning." 1 7 In the Niigata case, the district court further eased the
plaintiffs' burden, asserting that "to require point-by-point scientific
verification in order to establish causality would be a barrier to civil
relief" and ruling instead that "if characteristic symptoms of the dis-
ease in question and the route by which pathogenic substances were
gain access to its shareholders' meeting. Within the first two months of the
campaign, 5,000 people had each bought one share. Thereafter, the victims
dressed in the traditional white raimants used in times of pilgramage and
marcied in a solemn column from Minimata to Osaka where the sharehold-
ers' meeting was being held. In Osaka, the victims entered the meeting and,
surrounded by supporters, chanted, "We don't want your money. We want
you all, one by one, to drink the mercury-filled water."
Id.
10' Marcus, supra note 18, at 197.
1 10 For an excellent in-depth discussion of these cases, see Upham, Litigation and Moral
Consciousness in Japan: An Interpretive Analysis of Four Japanese Pollution Suits, 10 LAW & Soc'Y
579 (1976); see also ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 106, at 5-124 (includes translations
of major portions of the "Big Four" decisions).
I ' Komatsu v. Mitsui Kinzoku K6gyo K.K., HANJI (No. 635) 17 (Toyama D.C. 1971),
aff'd on Koso appeal, HANJI (No. 674) 25 (1972).
112 Taniguchi, A Commentaty on the Legal Theo"y of the Four M ajor Pollution Cases, 9 LAW IN
JAPAN 35, 36-37 (1976).
113 Upham, supra note 110, at 608.
114 Taniguchi, supra note 112, at 37.
115 Marcus, supra note 18, at 196.
: I Taniguchi, supra note 112, at 37.
7 )no v. Sh6wa Denk6 K.K., HANJI (No. 642) 96 (Niigata D.C. 1971); Watanabe v.
Chisso K.K., HANJI (No. 696) 15 (Kumamoto D.C. 1973).
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transmitted to the victims could be explained by an accumulation of
circumstantial evidence . . . which traced the source of pollution to
the 'doorstep of the enterprise,' then proof of legal causality" would
be established absent a showing by defendant that its plant could not
have been the source of the pollution.' 18
The Kumamoto case was significant because the court placed a
strict burden on defendant companies to exercise extraordinary care
in dealing with hazardous substances.11i In each of these cases,
large damages were awarded to the plaintiffs.1 20
Finally, the Japanese courts examined an air pollution-related
injury case.' 2' Unlike the other "Big Four" cases, this one involved
the activities of multiple defendants. The court again employed epi-
demiological studies and used a broad concept of joint liability:
If the injured parties could prove that there was an interrelation
among the injuring parties and that the effect was brought about by
their joint activities, it could be inferred that there was a causal rela-
tion between the activities of each of the injuring parties and the
effect produced. Unless the injuring parties could disprove such
causality, they would not be excused from liability. 12 2
The Yokkaichi decision was the first environmental suit to "recognize
the joint liability of industrial firms for atmospheric pollution."1 23
The environmental crisis and the "Big Four" decisions were the
motivating factors behind Japan's adoption of an administrative com-
pensation program. 124 Fearful that a flood of litigation might over-
whelm Japanese industry, business encouraged the government to
adopt the new system. 125 Moreover, the administrative system was
more compatible with the Japanese philosophy and culture, which
emphasize harmony and non-confrontational dispute resolution. 126
118 Taniguchi, supra note 112, at 37.
119 Marcus, supra note 18, at 196.
120 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 106, at 42-43.
121 Shion v. Sh6wa Yokkaichi Sekiyu, HANJI (No. 672) 30 (Tsu D.C. 1972).
122 Taniguchi, supra note 112, at 39.
123 Id. at 40.
124 Marcus, supra note 18, at 197; ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 106, at 44.
125 Miyamoto, The Environmental Protection Policy in Japan, in 5 ECONOMIC GROWTH AND
RESOURCEs 221 (S. Tsuru ed. 1978).
12t" Lansing & Wechselblatt, Doing Business in Japan: The Importance of the Unwritten Law,
17 INT'L LAW. 647, 653 (1983). "[S]ubmitting a dispute to court is viewed as a last re-
sort .... To bring a case to court emphasizes a failure of society and individuals to resolve
suits through traditional means." Id. "[T]he legal process is felt to be an expedient means
of keeping society orderly, but nothing more. When all else has failed, law comes into
play, but only because it must. Law is an expedient, not an end in itself." Kim & Lawson,
The Law of the Subtle Mind: The Traditional Japanese Conception of Law, 28 INT'L & COMP. L.Q
491, 504 (1979).
Whether it is due to the Japanese belief that judicial methods are not
conducive to harmony, the feudal attitude that one does not trouble one's
lord with private matters, the fact that the Japanese are not assertive of their
rights, the fact that litigation is too expensive in time and money, the
shortage of judges and lawyers, or, what is more likely, a combination of
these reasons, it is apparent that most disputes do not reach the courts.
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Japan, a country with a dearth of lawyers and high court costs, ab-
hors litigation. 127 Having experienced the trauma of the "Big Four"
cases, the Japanese apparently were ready to seek a more harmoni-
ous solution.
The basic design of the compensation law is simple. "Pollution
victims of designated diseases arising in officially identified pollution
areas" are certified by a council of medical and legal experts. Once
certified, victims are eligible to recover medical expenses and lost
earnings from the compensation fund.128
Diseases are categorized as Class I-illnesses caused by ambient
air pollution-or Class II-diseases caused by specific toxic sub-
stances. Funds for Class I disease compensation are derived primar-
ily from a levy on sulfur emissions, whereas Class II funding is
obtained from a "special levy" against the sources of the substances
associated with the victims' diseases.' 29
The proof of causation required to qualify for compensation
also varies according to the class of injury. In Class I cases, victims
need only demonstrate that they suffer "symptoms relating to the
designated diseases"' 30 and that they have resided in or commuted
to the designated pollution area for a minimum time.13' In Class II
cases, however, the assumption is made that "ascertaining causal
links between a specific substance and an individual's illness is in-
deed possible."' 3 2 Thus, certification will turn on a more traditional
finding of causation by the government.' 33
B. New Zealand's Accident Compensation Act
Like Japan, New Zealand has attempted to resolve the problems
of compensating victims through an administrative plan. Unlike the
Japanese law, though, the New Zealand statute does not deal specifi-
cally or solely with environmental injuries. Instead, the Accident
Compensation Act (ACA)i 34 applies to all cases of personal injury
resulting from "accidents."' 3 5 The ACA would, thus, probably
cover injuries resulting from identifiable, unexpected releases of haz-
ardous substances-"accidents"-but would not cover long-term ex-
See, TheJudiciary and Dispute Resolution in Japan: A Survey, 10 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 339,368
(1982).
127 See supra note 126.
128 ENVIRONMENTAL LAw, supra note 106, at 290.
129 Aronson, Review Essay: Environmental Law in Japan, 7 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 135,
154-55 (1983).
130 Note, supra note 27, at 527.
131 Aronson, supra note 129; at 162.
132 Id. at 163.
133 Id.; see also Note, supra note 27, "The system in Class II is causation-based and firm-
specific because the government is required to establish the relationship between the dis-
ease and the pollution." Id. at 527.
134 See supra note 21.
135 ACA, supra note 21, art. 5(1).
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posure to hazardous wastes resulting from negligent handling and
disposal practices. Furthermore, although the Japanese Compensa-
tion Law does not bar a victim from suing in court, 136 the ACA com-
pletely supplants the common law system of remedies in the
personal injury field. 13 7
The New Zealand act was not born in any climate of crisis similar
to the Japanese experience. The ACA was adopted on the heels of
the Woodhouse Report, 13 8 the product of a commission appointed
to study the need for tort law reform and chaired by New Zealand
Supreme Court Justice Woodhouse. 13 9 The Woodhouse Report
found the common law deficient on two grounds. First, using an "in-
tuitive ... standard of equity and adequacy," the Report concluded
that the "essential needs of accident victims" were met in only a
"small fraction of cases."' 140 Second, the Report found that only a
few accident victims recovered "adequate" compensation. 14' The
recommendations of the Report, that an administrative compensa-
tion system be established in substitution of common law rights,
were incorporated into the bill that became the ACA. 14 2
The forces that swept the ACA into being are hard to identify.
The Woodhouse Report featured a "remarkable... lack of empirical
data," and there was "never at any time great public dissatisfaction
with existing arrangements."1 43
In some ways an elitist analysis of events is the most satisfying.
The scheme was the brainchild of two eminent judges-Mr. Justice
Woodhouse and, to a lesser extent, the Chief Justice. Mr. Justice
Woodhouse led the Royal Commissioners to recommend the desira-
bility of radical change; a powerful Minister of the Crown came to
share that view; and on studying the matter, top echelons of the pub-
lic service came to the same conclusions. That was enough. Some
of the politicians may not have liked the scheme, and it was bent
somewhat in deference to the wishes of some of the pressure
groups. But the blueprint came from the guardians on high and was
for that reason very difficult to modify. 14
The "blueprint" that became the ACA called for establishment
136 See Miyamoto, supra note 125, at 221.
137 Klar, New Zealand's Accident Compensation Scheme: A Tort Lawyers Perspective, 33 U.
TORONTO L.J. 80, 81 (1983).
138 ROYAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY, COMPENSATION FOR PERSONAL INJURY IN NEW ZEA-
LAND (1967) (Woodhouse Report).
131) Marks, A First in National .Vo-Fault: The Accident Compensation Act 1972 of .Vew Zealand,
47 AUSTRALIAN L.J. 516 (1973).
140 Gaskins, Tort Reform in the W1elfare State: The New Zealand Accident Compensation Act, 18
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 238, 245 (1980).
141 Id.
142 Marks, supra note 139, at 516.
143 Palmer & Lemons, 7oard the Disappearance of Tort L.aw: Neu' Zedlands Neu, Compensa-
tion Plan, 1972 U. ILL. L.J. 693, 739.
144 Id. See Palmer, Compensation.for Personal lnjmy: . Requieoifor the Common Lan' in Aew,
Zealand, 21 AM. J. CoMI,. ,. 1, 31-39 (1973) for a thorough discussion of the processes
involved in the formulation and adoption of the ACA.
296 [VOL. 12
REMEDIES FOR HAZARDOUS WASTE VICTIMS
of a compensation commission to operate the compensation pro-
gram. Basically, all wage earners suffering personal injury by acci-
dent are eligible for compensation. Medical benefits, lost earnings,
and other pecuniary losses are compensable.' 45 In sum, the ACA
serves as a no-fault means of government insurance for most per-
sonal injuries; victims need only establish that they are "wage earn-
ers" and that their injuries were caused by "accidents" within the
meaning of the act.
Given the existence of these administrative compensation
schemes in Japan and New Zealand, it is not unreasonable to ques-
tion whether a similar approach might prove advantageous in the
United States. The best method of analyzing that question is to de-
termine whether an administrative system could better meet the
identified goals of the tort system: compensation, fairness, deter-
rence, and general societal well-being.
IV. Analysis: Administrative Compensation as an Alternative
to Tort Law
A. Compensation and Fairness Goals
The compensation programs in Japan and New Zealand are gen-
erally recognized as successful in providing compensation in a fast
and fair manner. The Japanese law has "introduced a regularity and
dispatch" into compensation that was not present under the old sys-
tem of civil litigation." 4 6 The compensation law is a "less burden-
some, quicker mediator between the polluter and the victim,"
resulting in lower transaction costs than the court system. 14 7 The
New Zealand ACA is similarly effective in extending "substantial
rights" to persons who would be excluded from recovery under the
tort system.148
Each statutory plan, however, is subject to criticism. The Japa-
nese approach is criticized because many victims are either over- or
under-compensated by the law's benefit provisions. 149 The law's
classification system has also been troublesome. Although the Act
provides for certification of new diseases, "the Japanese government
has been reluctant to recognize them"; cancer, for instance, is not a
compensable disease under the Act.' 50 Thus, many possible victims
are precluded from recovery. Further, the Class II system, by tying
recovery payments to "specific firms and to specific diseases and
symptoms" also limits the ability of the system to reach victims of
145 Palmer, supra note 144, at 17-19.
146 Gresser, The 1973Japanese Law for the Compensation of Pollution-Related Health Damage:
An Introductory Assessment, 8 LAw IN JAPAN 91, 119 (1975).
147 Note, supra note 27, at 527-28.
148 Marks, supra note 139, at 521.
149 ENVIRONMENTAL LAw, supra note 106, at 307.
150 Marcus, supra note 18, at 201.
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diseases caused by exposure to other hazardous wastes. 15 1
The New Zealand ACA has also been hampered by difficulties.
First, financial problems have plagued the compensation system,
leaving the payment fund with a shortfall on several occasions.' 52
Charges that the benefits payable under the ACA are inadequate
have also been levied.'15 3 Because the ACA prohibits all civil actions
for damages arising out of personal injury by accident, "persons who
have some cover under the act will be unable to claim damages for
losses which they have suffered but which are not compensable
under the scheme."' 54 Second, the definition of what constitutes an
"accident" covered by the ACA has been elusive. In some cases, par-
ties have been barred from proceeding civilly against wrongdoers
who have committed intentional or reckless acts because these acts
have been classified as "accidents" covered by the ACA. 155 More-
over, injury by disease has been excluded from ACA coverage,' 56
thus making the scheme of limited application to environmental
injuries.
As a general proposition, then, the Japanese and New Zealand
programs have met with mixed success. Any attempt to adopt a simi-
lar approach in the United States would necessarily have to reflect
modifications in these schemes designed to overcome their short-
comings. The problems of proving causation, left open in Japan's
Class II system 157 and in New Zealand's no-fault plan, 158 would have
to be corrected. Adoption of an administrative plan that incorpo-
rates the reforms proposed for tort law-favorable presumptions for
victims, use of epidemiological and other statistical forms of evi-
dence, relaxed burdens of proof-would help make the administra-
tive scheme a fairer, more reliable, and more accessible
compensation tool. Such a plan could have many benefits in terms
of adequate and fair compensation:
Eligibility requirements and standards for determining the size of
damage awards could be set uniformly by a centralized agency over-
seen by Congress, rather than being haphazardly determined
through the process of litigation. From society's standpoint, admin-
istrative compensation would allow a more informed choice con-
151 Note, supra note 27, at 527-28.
152 Murphy, Letters to the Editor: National Compensation Scheme, 55 LAW INST. J. 807
(1981).
153 Id.
154 Klar, supra note 137, at 86.
In all cases, even where there is cover and a claim, the level of compen-
sation available tinder the scheme will very likely differ from what would have
been available by proceeding civilly. In other words, there has been a very
uneven replacement of common law rights by accident compensation rights.
Id.
155 Id. at 87-88.
156 Id. at 89.
157 Aronson, supma note 129, at 168-69.
158 See Trauberman, supra note 29, at 207-08.
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cerning the amount of compensation provided to toxic tort victims.
From the standpoint of individual victims, the uncertainties and de-
lays of litigation would be replaced with a more certain, albeit less
generous, administrative award. 159
B. Deterrence
One major argument made against administrative compensation
is that abandonment of tort liability would remove the incentive to
minimize unsafe and harmful practices, thereby increasing the costs
of hazardous waste injuries. 160 The Japanese Compensation Law at-
tempts to resolve this problem by forcing Class II polluters to pay for
the injuries they cause, and by collecting compensation funds for
Class I injuries on the basis of pollution emissions.' 6 1 The extent to
which this sytem has succeeded in reducing emissions and injuries is
not clear; although sulfur oxide emissions have been reduced since
passage of the Act, other factors are probably responsible.' 6 2 The
case of New Zealand is more instructive. Although the ACA com-
pletely abandoned the concept of "deterrence" as a goal of the com-
pensation system,' 6 3 there has been no significant increase in
automobile accidents since the law was enacted. 164
Given the fact that tort liability does not usually deter wrongful
or dangerous conduct to any great extent,' 6 5 "deterrence should
play a minor role in determining whether to abolish or modify tort
law and replace it with a no-fault compensation scheme."' 6 6 At-
tempts to deter often interfere with the more important goal of com-
pensation of victims anyway.' 67 Thus, "the main purpose of toxic
tort compensation funds should be exactly what their name implies:
159 Developments, supra note 10, at 1659.
160 Trauberman, supra note 29, at 207. Absent a firm-specific remedy, compensation
through an administrative scheme would serve as no more a deterrent than tort liability
does now. Note, supra note 27, at 515.
161 Note, supra note 27, at 516, 527. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
162 Aronson, supra note 129, at 156-59. Industry has complained that, despite the
lower levels of pollution, victim certification has continued to grow and the pollution levy
has "skyrocketed." Morishima & Smith, Accident Conipensation Schemes in Japan: A lWindow on
the Operation of Law in a Society, 20 U. BRIT. COL. L. REV. 491, 514-15 (1986).
1 3 Klar, supra note 137, at 81.
164 Brown, Deterrence in Tort and No-Fault: The Aew Zealand Experience, 73 CALIF. L. REV.
976, 1001-02 (1985).
165 See supra notes 82-95 and accompanying text. Moreover, suggested reforms in the
tort system, such as shifting burdens of proof, are not likely to improve the deterrent
success of the common law: "No technical adjustment of the legal rules in personal injury
suits will encourage manufacturers of toxic substances to investigate, analyze, and reduce
the level of risk entailed by the manufacture of toxic substances." Soble, supra note 30, at
767. "Minor palliatives cannot touch the endemic inadequacies in the tort system."
Pierce, supra note 24, at 1300-01.
166 Brown, supra note 164, at 979.
167 Note, supra note 27, at 516. A system "stressing both compensation and deter-
rence would be limited to injuries where a hazardous substance and a firm responsible for
that substance could be identified. In such a system, victims of injuries where substances
and firms were not identified would be denied compensation." Id.
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to compensate victims."' 16 8 Deterrence should be left to direct gov-
ernmental regulation and criminal sanctions.' 69 Abandonment of
the deterrence goal will ease the design and implementation
problems related to a successful compensation scheme.' 70
C. Societal Interests
One clear benefit of an administrative program is the-reduced
threat of bankruptcies and economic disruption found under the
present tort law system.' 7' By spreading the costs of the compensa-
tion fund widely enough, payment for the system could be achieved
without severe damage to any industry or collection of firms. A com-
bination of miniscule, across-the-board tax increases and budget
cuts, coupled with a broad-based tax on all industries that use or
manufacture hazardous substances would probably meet this crite-
rion. Such socialization of the costs of hazardous waste injuries is
logical if the assumption is made that "industrialization will always
jeopardize some people's health, while everyone . . .benefits from
economic growth." ' 72
Unfortunately, such a system of socialized benefits for toxic vic-
tims is unlikely to gain much support in the United States, given the
general antipathy towards government regulation now prevalent
among politicians. The panic atmosphere surrounding the budget
deficit will also preclude adoption of such a proposal. Moreover, un-
like in Japan, because the courts in the United States have failed to
take bold steps to correct the deficiencies in the tort system in the
toxic injury area, no impetus for adopting a compensation program
can be found.173
The problem of court overload may also be alleviated by adopt-
ing an administrative compensation scheme.174 In Japan, the com-
pensation law has been able to "stem the tide of litigation," although
appeals of administrative decisions still find their way into Japanese
courts. 17 5 Surprisingly, however, New Zealand, whose ACA totally
replaces available common law remedies, has not seen a resultant re-
duction in lawsuits. Instead, there has been "an almost one-for-one
replacement of personal injury cases by two other categories of law-
suits: 'administrative appeals' and 'contract and other tort' ac-
tions."' 17 6 Whether there would have been more suits overall had
168 Abraham, supra note 81, at 148.
169 Id.; Brown, supra note 164, at 979.
170 Pierce, supra note 24, at 1289, 1307.
171 See supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text.
172 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 106, at 321.
173 See Marcus, supra note 18, at 200.
174 See Schwartz & Means, supra note 53, at 1097.
175 Marcus, supra note 18, at 200.
176 Johnson, Our Crowded Courts: The Paradox of Too Alany Cases and Too Little Access, in
AMERICAN/AUSTRALIAN/NEW ZEALAND LAW: PARALLELS AND CONTRASTS 39-40 (1980).
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not the ACA been enacted cannot, however, be determined. In any
event, an administrative program may, nevertheless, be worthwhile
even if the overall court load is not significantly reduced, on the
grounds that courts have not demonstrated the technical compe-
tence or ingenuity to adequately handle toxic tort cases.
For this reason, any administrative plan should, like the ACA, be
the exclusive remedy for hazardous substance victims. Providing an
exclusive remedy would prevent double recoveries and redundant
use of judicial resources.' 77 Although some commentators argue
that the common law remedies should be retained to take advantage
of the common law's "flexibility" and ability to develop innovative
legal doctrines,1 78 the past record of U.S. courts does not justify this
faith in the tort system in the context of toxic torts. U.S. courts have
failed to adapt themselves to the problems posed by toxic torts; their
"innovations" have been inadequate.
V. Conclusion
The need for action in the hazardous waste injury area is para-
mount. The tort system has failed to fairly and adequately compen-
sate victims of toxic torts or to deter manufacturers of hazardous
substances from using illegal, improper, and unsafe methods of dis-
posal. The judicial system has failed to respond to the need for
change, and Congress has "studied" the issue of victim compensa-
tion for half a dozen years without taking concrete action. In con-
trast, Japan and New Zealand have developed administrative
programs that, although undoubtedly imperfect, at least attempt to
grapple with the shortcomings of litigation in the modern era. The
failure of the United States to act boldly in this area of grave concern
is inexcusable and indeed shameful.
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